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The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of
Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson
Roger Park*
In a recent article,1 Professor Charles Nesson offered an
unorthodox explanation for the existence and structure of the
rules excluding hearsay evidence. In his view, the hearsay
rules have evolved because they promote the stability of ver-
dicts by ensuring that hearsay declarants will not appear after a
trial at which their statements have been admitted and recant
their statements. If accepted as valid, Professor Nesson's thesis
would radically alter thinking about the hearsay rule. In my
view, however, his thesis is fundamentally flawed, and other
explanations for the persistence of the hearsay rule are more
convincing. This Article will first examine these other expla-
nations for the exclusion of hearsay and then evaluate Nesson's
theory.
The conventional explanation for the exclusion of hearsay
centers on the danger of admitting evidence that has not been
tested for reliability. Unlike courtroom witnesses, hearsay de-
clarants have not testified under oath, in the presence of the
trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination. These court-
room safeguards have the dual effect of encouraging witnesses
to be accurate and of exposing defects in their credibility.
Cross-examination is a particularly valuable safeguard because
of the opportunity it provides to test credibility by exploring
weaknesses in a declarant's memory, perception, narrative abil-
ity, and sincerity. The fundamental flaw of hearsay evidence is
that the adversary has not had the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the out-of-court declarant.2
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I wish to
thank my colleagues Daniel Farber and Donald Marshall for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Ac-
ceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357 (1985).
2. See, e.g., G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159-60
(1978); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1362, at 7 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1974). The theory that the absence of cross-examination
makes hearsay inferior to other evidence explains why courts should not
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Wigmore tried to show that the lack of opportunity to test
reliability with cross-examination was the sole basis for the
hearsay ban.3 Nonetheless, judges and lawyers have advanced
a variety of other reasons for excluding hearsay.4 Some have
focused not on the unreliability of the out-of-court declarant
but on the unreliability of the witness who reports the hearsay
statement in court-a witness who is, of course, subject to
cross-examination. An in-court witness who reports a hearsay
statement is difficult to discredit;5 lawyers and witnesses may
therefore be tempted to fabricate hearsay evidence.6 Concern
lightly permit the substitution of hearsay declarations for live testimony. It
does not explain, however, why they should exclude hearsay even when cross-
examination is impossible because the declarant is unavailable. In these cir-
cumstances, it would seem wiser to admit hearsay for what it is worth than to
discard it because it is weaker than courtroom testimony. At least in jury tri-
als, however, one can argue that hearsay should still be excluded because the
absence of cross-examination makes the evidence difficult to evaluate and the
jury may therefore give it undue weight. See Weinstein, Probative Force of
Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 335 (1961). The persistent failure of lawmakers
to create a general exception for hearsay statements by unavailable declarants
may, of course, be attributable to concerns other than the absence of cross-ex-
amination, for example, concern about fraud by the in-court witness. See infra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
3. See 5 J. WIGMOIE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 7 ("the essence of the Hear-
say rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the
test of cross-examination"). Wigmore disparaged jurists who said that hearsay
statements should be excluded because the in-court witness might report them
incorrectly or because admission of hearsay might lead to fraud by cataloguing
quotes from their opinions under the heading "Spurious Theories of the Hear-
say Rule." Id. § 1363, at 10.
4. See, e.g., G. LILLY, supra note 2, at 159-60; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2,
§ 1362, at 10-12.
5. See, e.g., Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns 45, 50 (1812) (Kent, C. J.) ("A
person who relates a hearsay, is not obliged to enter into any particulars, to
answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions,
to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities: he entrenches himself
in the simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely on
his dead or absent author."). One might add that were hearsay freely admissi-
ble, the witness who wanted to concoct a hearsay statement would be free to
choose a time and place at which no one was present but the witness and the
supposed declarant.
6. See, e.g., Ellicot v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836) (Story, J.)
(besides lacking an oath and cross-examination, the fault of hearsay is "that it
is peculiarly liable to be obtained by fraudulent contrivances"); Mima Queen v.
Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 296 (1813) (Marshall, J.) (referring to the
"frauds which might be practiced" in the absence of the hearsay rule); En-
glebretson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 798, 151 P. 421, 423
(1915) (indicating concern about possible fraud in the absence of the hearsay
rule); Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Ev-
idence, 19 CAL. ST. B.J. 262, 274-75 (1944) ("[W]hen the self-interest which ac-
tuates parties to litigation and their friends and witnesses is considered, the
chance of perpetration of actual fraud by either or both parties equals, if it
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about fabrication embraces, but goes beyond, the desire to
promote accurate fact-finding, because perjury is a mischief
whether it affects fact-finding or not. The in-court witness may
also be more vulnerable to innocent mistake when describing
statements than when describing other observations and hence
may unintentionally present misleading evidence to the trier of
fact.7
The free admission of hearsay could have other undesirable
effects. Unreliable hearsay evidence might furnish a peg on
which a lawless jury, though disbelieving the evidence, could
hang a verdict based on sentiment or bias.8 Abolition of the
hearsay rule might hamper the speedy disposition of weak
cases, because the effectiveness of the motion for summary
judgment would be undermined if affiants could successfully
defeat the motion with hearsay evidence. Free admission of
hearsay might also waste time and resources by opening the
door to evidence that is both low in probative value and costly
to rebut.9
The desire of lawyers to protect their professional role may
also help explain opposition to the free admission of hearsay.
does not exceed, the chance of inaccuracy that would be inherent in hearsay
testimony of truthful witnesses.").
7. See, e.g., Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model
Code of Evidence, supra note 6, at 274 (1944). After first noting that the accu-
racy of hearsay statements cannot be tested by cross-examination, the report
continues:
But the real objection goes deeper. If cross-examination were to be
done away with entirely and the truth of an issue were to be deter-
mined wholly upon the direct examination of witnesses produced by
each party, still we would be as strongly opposed to the proposed rule.
We believe that experience has shown that, laying aside entirely ques-
tions of perjury, corrupt motives or interest in one party or the other,
that one of the most common occurrences is for one man to misunder-
stand the statements or declarations of another.
IM.; see also E. CLEARY, McCoRMiCK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 245, at 727 (3d ed. 1984) ("It seems probable that the reporting of words spo-
ken is subject to special dangers of inaccuracy beyond the fallibility common
to all reproduction from memory of matters of observation, and this seems a
substantial danger in the admission of hearsay.") (footnote omitted) [hereinaf-
ter cited as McCoRMICK]; cf. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A
Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L. REV. 1, 13-14, 19 (noting dangers of mistransmission).
8. Cf. Hart & McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in
the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 56 (D. Lerner ed. 1958) (one reason for
the hearsay rule is to "prevent errant juries from basing an essential finding
upon the slender reed of hearsay evidence").
9. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 336. Although favoring a radical liber-
alization of the hearsay rule, Weinstein recognized trial convenience as one ar-
gument that could be made in favor of excluding hearsay. Id.
19861 1059
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Bar groups repeatedly have expressed the fear that the free ad-
mission of hearsay would make trial preparation more difficult
and would increase the danger of unfair surprise at trial.'0 Re-
laxing the hearsay rules would alter the lawyer's professional
role in other ways: documentary evidence would become more
important, sometimes replacing the drama and excitement of
live testimony; there would be less opportunity to exercise
skills of cross-examination; and judges would have more discre-
tion and stronger control." Criminal defense attorneys and
other lawyers concerned about the rights of criminal defend-
ants may also fear that abolition would shift the balance of ad-
vantage to the prosecution, and that it would encourage
unscrupulous tactics by police investigators because witness
statements taken by them would have much greater impor-
tance.'2 Finally, lawyers who have mastered the hearsay rules
have acquired a valuable and exclusive skill at the cost of a
large intellectual investment; fear of losing this investment
may make them less receptive to change.
10. See authorities cited infra note 49.
11. Most advocates of liberalization would not make hearsay admissible
without limit, but would give the judge discretion to admit it in appropriate
cases even if it did not fit a conventional exception. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 338-39; Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C.L.
REV. 281, 293 (1980); Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, Rule 803(a) (1969), reprinted in
2 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 173 (1980). The fear of unbridled discre-
tion has been one of the bar's primary reasons for opposing these proposals for
broader admission of hearsay. See, e.g., Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, Ser. No. 2 (Supp.), 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1973) (statement of American
College of Trial Lawyers) (opposing broad admissibility of hearsay and con-
demning increased judicial discretion) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules of
Evidence: House Hearings]; id. at 91 (statement of Washington State Bar As-
sociation) (opposing proposed residual exceptions on grounds of increased judi-
cial discretion); id. at 356 (statement of Colorado Bar Association) (opposing
residual exceptions on grounds that they "inject too much uncertainty and dis-
cretion into the law of evidence"); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, 21 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5005, at 88 (1977) ("[lit is now part of the lore
that the [Model] Code failed because lawyers objected to the power left in the
trial judge. While scholars and appellate court judges may be comfortable
with the idea, most practicing lawyers are not 'Big Pots' who can count on the
trial judge to be benign in his exercise of discretion.").
12. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: House Hearings, supra note 11, at 92-
93 (statement of Frederick D. McDonald) ("the proposed rule will place enor-
mous power in the hands of investigators"); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 521, 522 & n.42 (2d ed. 1982) ("the balance of
advantage [under proposals to liberalize hearsay] lies with the state in criminal
cases").
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Although none of these considerations can explain all of
the features of the hearsay rule and its exceptions, each has
probably had some influence. The conventional focus on the
reliability of the out-of-court declarant, for example, explains
the absence of any restriction on the admission of statements
that are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.13
These statements are just as subject to dangers of fabrication,
mistransmission, and surprise as any other; their easy admissi-
bility suggests that once concern about the reliability of the de-
clarant is removed,14 other concerns are not strong enough to
bar admission. The absence of a general distinction between
documentary and oral hearsay also suggests that fears of
fabrication or mistransmission by the in-court witness are sec-
ondary considerations. L5 Nonetheless, concern about the relia-
bility of the in-court witness has had some influence. The
limits on the scope of the exception for declarations against in-
terest reflect this concern,1 6 and it may have influenced other
exceptions, such as those displaying a preference for documen-
tary hearsay over oral hearsay. 7 It may also help explain why
13. Under the conventional definition, a statement is not hearsay if it is
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
801(c).
14. Generally, when statements are not offered for the truth of the mat-
tar asserted, they do not depend for value on the credibility of the declarant.
Hence there is no reason for concern about the declarant's reliability. Admit-
tedly, in certain special situations, a statement not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted will depend for value to some degree upon the declarant's
credibility. For examples, see Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept
ofHearsay, 65 MINN. L. REv. 423, 426-37 (1981).
15. Cf. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1363, at 10-11 (it is "spurious" to as-
sert that hearsay is excluded because of the danger of mistransmission by the
witness reporting it, because the hearsay rule makes no general distinction be-
tween oral and written transmissions).
16. The long-term reluctance of courts to recognize an exception for state-
ments against penal interest stems at least in part from "fear of opening a
door to a flood of witnesses testifying falsely to confessions that were never
made." MCCORMIcK, supra note 7, § 278, at 823. The federal declarations
against interest rule, FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3), contains a corroboration require-
ment applicable to statements "tending to expose the declarant to criminal lia-
bility and offered to exculpate the accused." Id. It seems likely that this
requirement was based at least partly on fear that in-court witnesses would
manufacture evidence.
17. Most of the hearsay exceptions apply to out-of-court statements that
exist in recorded form. See FED. R. EVID. 803-804. These exceptions manifest
a preference for recorded statements over oral statements of a similar nature.
The business records exception, for example, applies to recorded statements
but not to oral business-related statements that otherwise meet the require-
ments of the rule. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); see also McCoRMICK, supra note 7,
at 873-74 ("usual statements of the rule" do not include oral reports). A pref-
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lawmakers have not created a general exception for statements
of unavailable declarants.18 A concern frequently voiced by
trial lawyers-that free admission of hearsay will lead to sur-
prise at trial-is reflected most vividly in the notice provisions
of the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.19 This concern
also may have helped make certain exceptions that miniTni e
the risk of surprise continuously palatable to lawyers who op-
pose liberalizing the hearsay rule.20
Professor Nesson takes issue with these traditional ratio-
nales. He begins by evaluating one of the traditional justifica-
tions for the exclusion of hearsay: the danger that triers of
fact, especially juries, will be misled by unreliable evidence.
Nesson argues that this justification does not explain the rule.
Jurors are capable of assessing the reliability of hearsay evi-
dence, he says, and "they would undoubtedly be given this task
if reliability alone were at stake. '21 He contends that "there
must be another, distinct rationale for the hearsay rules."22 He
finds that rationale in the rules' enhancement of the social ac-
ceptability of verdicts. After considering and discarding the
view that exclusion of hearsay enhances the "immediate" ac-
ceptability of verdicts, he decides that the hearsay rules "may
be grounded on the legal system's concern for continuing ac-
ceptance of the verdict." 23 In his view, hearsay and confronta-
tion rules
prevent jurors from basing a verdict on the statement of an out-of-
erence for recorded statements suggests concern about problems of uninten-
tional mistransmission of oral statements, a problem created by the inaccuracy
of in-court witnesses, not out-of-court declarants.
18. If the unreliability of the declarant were the only concern, lawmakers
might have been more willing to say that when the declarant is unavailable,
hearsay evidence should be admitted for what it is worth because it cannot be
replaced by the declarant's in-court testimony. If perjury by the in-court wit-
ness is an independent concern, however, the exclusion of this evidence makes
more sense. The danger of perjury is increased by the unavailability of the de-
clarant (especially when the declarant is dead), and perjury is undesirable
whether the trier can detect it or not. Thus, the hearsay rule may reflect in
part the policies that were served by the Dead Man's statutes. In a well-
known statute creating a broad exception for statements of deceased persons,
Massachusetts lawmakers included a requirement that the judge make a pre-
liminary determination that the out-of-court statement was in fact made, a
requirement that suggests fear of perjury by the in-court witness. See infra
note 32.
19. See FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (requiring notice before trial of in-
tent to offer a statement under a residual exception).
20. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
21. Nesson, supra note 1, at 1372.
22. I&
23. Id. at 1373 (emphasis in original).
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court declarant who might later recant the statement and discredit
the verdict. Cross-examination of a declarant minimizes the risk that
a verdict will be undercut by ensuring that the declarant cannot easily
recant his statement. During cross-examination, the declarant com-
mits his integrity to the accusation; subsequent recantation of the
statement would constitute an admission of perjury.24
Nesson suggests that the hearsay exceptions distinguish be-
tween kinds of hearsay according to the degree to which they
threaten a verdict's stability. Thus dying declarations, despite
their unreliability, are admitted because the declarant is not
likely to appear later and recant.2 Statements of party oppo-
nents are admissible, even if unreliable, because their ad-
mission does not endanger respect for verdicts. The party
opponent has the opportunity to speak up at trial,26 and to any
argument that party might subsequently make, the answer
would be, "'Did you say that at trial, and if not, why not?' "7
Nesson explains the persistence of the excited utterance excep-
tion in a similar fashion. Although excited utterances are unre-
liable, verdicts based upon them are socially acceptable and
stable because a declarant who later recanted an excited utter-
ance would not be believed.28 The recantation would occur af-
ter the declarant had learned of the significance of the
statement in litigation, and would hence be suspect.29
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1374.
26. Actually, though this opportunity will no doubt ordinarily be present,
the admissions rule does not require that it be. The party admission is admis-
sible even if the party who made it is unavailable for trial. See FED. R. Evm.
801(d)(2).
27. Nesson, supra note 1, at 1375.
28. Id
29. In 1980, the Harvard Law Review published a student note expressing
similar views. See Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1786 (1980). After first attempting to demonstrate that the
hearsay rule can not be justified on grounds that it excludes evidence that is
unreliable or evidence that the jury might misuse, the note expresses the opin-
ion that the rule against hearsay has endured because it enhances the social
acceptability of verdicts. According to the note, it does so in two ways:
First, the hearsay rules shield the system from possible embarrass-
ment. Admitting hearsay generally creates the possibility that the de-
clarant might later come forward to reveal that injustice resulted
from the trier of fact's reliance on such evidence. Second, hearsay is
distinctive in that its deficiencies can be observed readily by anyone
outside the system. With other evidence, the jury functions as a
"black box": its ability to observe demeanor, though limited in re-
vealing truth, "justifies" deference to the jury's decision because the
jury ostensibly has additional information that those absent could not
possibly duplicate and those present could not fully communicate.
Id. at 1808 (footnotes omitted).
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The first problem with Nesson's thesis is that fear of subse-
quent attacks on verdicts would better explain the admission
than the exclusion of hearsay evidence. Nesson believes that in
the absence of a hearsay rule, declarants whose statements had
been put into evidence might appear after the verdict and
recant, thus threatening the stability or acceptability of ver-
dicts. Nesson overlooks, however, the danger that declarants
whose statements were excluded as hearsay might appear, af-
firm their statements, and offer to testify at a new trial. Their
challenge to the verdict's acceptability would be more serious,
because their position about the facts would have been com-
pletely consistent.
In the situation postulated by Nesson, the recanting declar-
ant appears after the verdict and says, "My first statement was
false, and you used it in evidence; let's have a new trial so that I
can tell the truth." In this situation the admission of hearsay
threatens the acceptability of the verdict. Consider, however,
the situation in which hearsay has been excluded and the de-
clarant appears to challenge the verdict. In this situation, the
declarant would be saying, "My first statement was true, but
you would not hear it; now I am here in person and ready to
testify to the facts, so let's have a new trial." The second situa-
tion seems more of a threat to the acceptability of the verdict
than the first. If so, fear of the reappearing declarant should
have led to the abolition, not the retention, of the hearsay rule.
Even if one assumes, however, that the declarant whose
statement was admitted does present a greater threat to verdict
stability than the declarant whose statement was excluded, it is
highly unlikely that the architects of the rule were influenced
to any appreciable degree by fear that declarants would chal-
lenge verdicts. If they were, then the rule has been designed
even more irrationally than its severest critics have claimed. If
the rulemakers actually had designed it to protect against re-
canting declarants, the hearsay rule would have the following
two features.
First, all statements by deceased declarants would be ad-
missible because the dead cannot return and threaten a ver-
dict's stability by recanting a hearsay declaration. The hearsay
rule does not, of course, have a general exception for state-
ments of dead declarants. Whether the declarant is dead or
alive is not even a factor to be considered under the majority of
hearsay exceptions.30 True, the death of the declarant is rele-
30. The 24 exceptions listed in Rule 803, as well as the party admission
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vant to admissibility under Rule 804, but only as one of many
forms of unavailability which, in conjunction with other re-
quirements, can justify admission.31 If verdict stability were
the purpose of the hearsay rule, death would be given special
status.32 Instead, Rule 804's broader exceptions for unavailable
declarants suggest that the drafters were not worried about
returning declarants because the evidence was considered
reliable.
Second, all statements by available declarants would be ex-
cluded. The declarant would be required to testify in court to
protect the verdict from subsequent attack. The present hear-
say rules are radically different, however. All of the most
important exceptions, those described in Rule 803, permit state-
ments to be entered in evidence whether or not the declarant is
available. Of course, many out-of-court statements are rou-
tinely admitted as not being hearsay at all-whether or not the
and co-conspirator rules in Rule 801, apply whether the declarant is unavaila-
ble or not. FED. R. EVID. 801, 803. Cf. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hear-
say: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirements, 70
MINN. L. REV. 665 (1986) (examining when exemptions from the unavailability
requirement should be recognized by courts).
31. See FED. R. EVID. Rule 804(b)(1)-(5). Actually, Rule 804(b)(5), the
residual exception, does not functionally require unavailability, since its identi-
cally worded twin, Rule 803(24), dispenses with that requirement. See FED.
R.EvM. 803(24).
32. Massachusetts and Rhode Island are the only states that have gener-
ally applicable exceptions for deceased declarants. Since 1898, Massachusetts
has had a statute making statements of decedents broadly admissible in civil
actions. The current version of the statute reads as follows: "In any action or
other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not be
inadmissible in evidence as hearsay ... if the court finds that it was made in
good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant." MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 233, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1974). See also R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-19-11 (1985)
(declarations of a decedent made in good faith are not inadmissible hearsay).
The Massachusetts approach has not spread, although a few states have
enacted much more limited statutes for cases involving suits against the es-
tates of decedents. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1576 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974 & Supp. 1985). Subsequent attempts to codify a
similar principle have made the statements of unavailable declarants broadly
admissible, a principle that is not strictly in keeping with the verdict stability
thesis because the temporarily unavailable declarant might return and chal-
lenge the verdict. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 503(a) (1942); UNIF. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5) (1974); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (Proposed Draft 1975). These
proposals have met with either total failure (in the case of the Model Code and
the proposed federal rule) or very limited success. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, § 1577; MCCoRMICK, supra note 7, § 326. At any rate, neither they nor
the Massachusetts statute were justified on grounds that they protected
against recanting declarants, but on grounds that hearsay is reliable enough to
be admitted when no better evidence is available. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, §§ 1576-77.
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declarant is available and whether or not a danger of subse-
quent attack exists.
If the developers of the hearsay rule were concerned about
the recanting declarant, they also would have been concerned
about the repudiating declarant-the declarant who steps for-
ward after trial and denies having made the statement that was
admitted into evidence. This declarant would seem to pose as a
great a threat to the stability of verdicts. Yet the hearsay rule
shows no concern whatsoever about the repudiating declarant.
If it did, there would be some limits on the admissibility of out-
of-court statements that, under conventional analysis, are not
hearsay at all. For example, suppose that in a prosecution for
intentional tax evasion, the government offers evidence that
the defendant was warned by his tax advisor that his prize in-
come was taxable. The government offers the out-of-court
statement by the tax advisor into evidence to show the defend-
ant's guilty knowledge. The witness who testifies about the
statement is the defendant's former partner, who is cooperating
with the government in return for leniency. The tax advisor is
available but is not called by the government. Under current
law, the statement would routinely be admitted as nonhear-
say.33 The traditional explanation for admission would be that
cross-examination of the advisor is unnecessary because the
trier's use of the evidence does not require reliance on the advi-
sor's credibility. Cross-examining the advisor to reveal defects
of memory, perception, narration, or sincerity would serve no
purpose; the advisor's statement gave the defendant guilty
knowledge whether or not there were hidden defects in the ad-
visor's credibility. As to whether the advisor's statement was in
fact made, and whether it was made in a serious and outwardly
credible fashion, cross-examination of the in-court witness who
heard the statement is considered sufficient.
That defects in the declarant's credibility pose no danger
does not, however, eliminate the danger of subsequent attacks
on the verdict. The tax advisor may later say that he never dis-
cussed prize money with the defendant, or that he did but gave
no warning. His word may be more credible than that of the
in-court witness, who testified under the pressure of an offer of
leniency. Moreover, the declarant was available and could have
33. See G. LILLY, supra note 2, at 165; see also United States v. Kutas, 542
F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1976) (a statement giving the defendant guilty knowl-
edge of an escapee's fugitive status is not hearsay), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977).
1066 [Vol. 70:1057
THE HEARSAY RULE
been called. Calling him to testify under oath would, according
to the verdict stability thesis, have protected the system against
effective recantation. Yet the specter of the reappearing declar-
ant has not caused lawmakers to place any conditions upon
the admissibility of statements that are not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.
Perhaps Nesson did not mean to advance the danger of re-
cantation as the sole basis for excluding hearsay. Certainly,
however, his article indicates that it is a more important ration-
ale than the traditional one of protecting the jury from unreli-
able evidence. The structure of the rule and its exceptions,
however, suggest that fear of recantation has not been a signifi-
cant force in shaping the rule at all. If the rulemakers were
really concerned about recantation, the hearsay rule would pro-
vide that when a declarant is available his testimony must be
offered instead of his out-of-court statement, whether the state-
ment falls under an exception or not or, for that matter,
whether it would be considered hearsay or not. At the very
least, the rules would provide that the declarant must be called
when the out-of-court statement is important evidence and
when the testimony of the declarant could be obtained without
undue burden.3 Yet the hearsay rule contains no "best evi-
dence" requirement. Statements offered for some purpose
other than proving the truth of the assertion are admissible no
matter how easily the declarant's testimony could be obtained.
The same is true for testimony admissible under Rule 801 as a
personal admission or the admission of an agent or co-conspira-
tor5 and for testimony admissible under the twenty-four hear-
say exceptions set forth in Rule 803.36 Only a few relatively
insignificant exceptions to the hearsay rule actually require un-
34. Even if lawmakers were reluctant openly to base changes in the hear-
say rules upon fear of recanting declarants, one would expect to have seen
more progress toward a rule requiring available declarants to testify if that
fear were a substantial unconscious (or conscious but concealed) motive. The
rule could be justified on quite different ostensible grounds. See, e.g., Stewart,
supra note 7, at 24 (supporting a requirement that available declarants be re-
quired to testify on the conventional ground that hearsay is unreliable). One
would also have expected the Massachusetts statute admitting statements of
deceased declarants, see supra note 32, to have achieved wider acceptance. It,
too, could have been supported on grounds other than the verdict stability the-
sis if that thesis were too embarrassing for lawmakers to acknowledge or to
allow to rise to consciousness. See i&i
35. See FED. R. Evin. 801(d)(2).
36. See FED. R. EvID. 803.
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availability as a condition of admission.37
Finally, Nesson's attempt to support his verdict stability
thesis by showing that the exceptions to the hearsay rule were
fashioned with the recanting declarant in mind is unconvincing.
To be sure, the dying declarations exception lends itself to an
argument that the real purpose of the exception is not to let in
reliable statements, but to do something else. Nesson argues
that "something else" is to let in evidence where there is no
chance that the declarant will reappear and recant.
The modem dying declarations exception does not require
that the declarant actually die, however, so he or she might
conceivably appear and recant. Nesson handles this difficulty
by saying that the federal rulemakers took the "articulated
logic" of the exception "perhaps too seriously."38 In other
words, the rulemakers were not privy to the real reason for the
hearsay rule. They thought that the conventional justifications
were the real justifications. One wonders whether any of the
creators and defenders of the hearsay rule were privy to its real
goal-and if they were not, how the rule could have a real goal
different from its articulated goal.3 9
Nesson may have been concerned with this problem him-
self, because at one point he states that he is "not asserting that
judges have designed or applied court rules and procedures
with the conscious objective of promoting acceptable ver-
dicts."40 He notes that rules that evolved without "conscious
design" may now serve important objectives that are not "con-
sciously appreciated. '41 Nonetheless, his hearsay discussion is
not intended merely to point out that the hearsay rule has un-
anticipated effects. His discussion clearly assumes that there is
a causal connection between the value he posits-stability of
verdicts-and the structure of the hearsay exceptions. Nesson
fails, however, to show any mechanism by which this value has
shaped the exceptions. The hearsay rule is not an organism
that exists and changes without the intervention of human
lawmakers pursuing human goals. Conceivably, the creators,
revisers, and defenders of the hearsay rule unconsciously wor-
37. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1)-(4). I have excluded 804(b)(5) from my
count of exceptions for the reason stated supra note 31.
38. Nesson, supra note 1, at 1374 n.56.
39. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 927
(1986) (something is wrong with an interpretation so clever that it never
would occur to the speaker).
40. Nesson, supra note 1, at 1369.
41. IM
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ried about the problem of the recanting declarant, although
they stated different reasons for excluding hearsay. It seems
incredible, however, that this specter haunted lawmakers for so
long without their recognizing and discussing it. For that mat-
ter, it seems odd, if the specter has had so much influence on
our law, that it has been so little noticed in any quarter-and
that our courts, which permit quite a bit of hearsay to be admit-
ted, have never produced a notable case in which the accepta-
bility of a verdict has been challenged by a recanting declarant.
I think that the explanation for the persistence of the dy-
ing declarations and excited utterances exceptions is probably
much more simple and pedestrian than Nesson's theory.42
Originally the rulemakers probably did consider dying declara-
tions and excited utterances reliable-in the case of dying dec-
larations, because no one would want to meet his Maker with a
lie upon his lips, 43 and in the case of excited utterances, because
it was thought that excitement temporarily suspended the ca-
pacity for fabrication.44 Changing ideas about religion have un-
dermined the rationale of the dying declarations exception.
Twentieth-century research about defects of memory and per-
ception has undermined the rationale of both exceptions by
raising doubts about the accuracy of statements made near
death or in excitement.45 Perhaps, also, changing ideas of
human nature have shifted concern away from the danger of
fabrication to dangers of defective memory and perception.46
Therefore, it would seem logical to eliminate these exceptions
and to exclude this testimony. Yet the academic lawyers who
42. See Farber, supra note 39, at 929 (advocating abandonment of brilliant,
"paradigm shifting" work in favor of more pedestrian "normal science").
43. See, e.g., Rex v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353
(K.B. 1789) (for the dying person, "every motive to falsehood is silenced, and
the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth");
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEiNSTEiN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(2)[01] (1985) (the
exception for dying declarations originally rested on religious beliefs); Quick,
Some Reflections on Dying Declarations, 6 How. L.J. 109, 111 (1960) ("the dy-
ing declarant, knowing he is about to die, would be unwilling to go to his
maker with a lie on his lips"). A more secular justification is that a dying per-
son lacks a motive to fabricate. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1438, at 289.
44. See, e.g., McCORMICK, supra note 7, § 297, at 855; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 2, § 1747.
45. See Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence,
28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 436 (1928); Stewart, supra note 7, at 10; authorities
cited in Nesson, supra note 1, at 1374 n.55.
46. Cf. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 45, at 435 (suggesting that em-
phasis by those who shaped the excited utterance exception on suspension of
the capacity for fabrication was based on obsolete theories of mentalist
psychology).
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have involved themselves in hearsay reform have generally
been more concerned with broadening admissibility than with
restricting it. They have favored liberalization of the rules in a
way that would radically increase the amount of evidence that
is admitted.47 They have not fully succeeded, but they have
been willing to take what they can get, even if it means the per-
petuation of exceptions whose rationale has decayed.48 The
procedural conservatives who have opposed liberalizing the
hearsay rule have objected strenuously to the creation of broad
new exceptions, but not to the perpetuation of established ones.
Perhaps they still accept the original rationale of these excep-
tions. Perhaps, since those arguing against hearsay liberaliza-
tion frequently advance the danger of surprise at trial as the
reason for their opposition,49 they do not find that danger sali-
47. See, e.g., J. MAGUIRE, EVDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW
147-65 (1947) (describing remedial proposals and experiments); C. McCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 634 (1954) ("the rule excluding
hearsay will eventually disappear"); E. MORGAN, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
36-50 (forward), 217-24 (introductory note to hearsay chapter) (1942) (describ-
ing Model Code's expansion of the hearsay rules); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 8(c), at 630-31 (P. Tillers rev. 1983) ("A complete
abolition of the [hearsay] rules in the future is at least arguable, not merely in
theory but in realizable fact."); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1427, 1576 (ad-
vocating expanding the hearsay rules exception for dying declarations); Mor-
gan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 909, 918-22 (1937) (increased admission of the hearsay rules would elimi-
nate inconsistencies); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 342 ('"The current trend is
clearly towards a much freer admissibility of hearsay.").
48. This attitude is suggested by the advisory committee's note to Rule
803(2), which acknowledges criticisms of the rationale of the excited utterance
rule but justifies perpetuating it simply on grounds that "it finds support in
cases without number." FED. R. EViD. 803(2) advisory committee note. The
advisory committee felt less precedent-bound when faced with the issue
whether to expand the admissibility of hearsay instead of rejecting it. See; eg.,
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (Proposed Draft 1973) (attempting to establish a broad
exception for statements of unavailable persons).
49. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: House Hearings, supra note 11, at 74
(statement of American College of Trial Lawyers) (asserting that broad admis-
sibility of hearsay will "make it impossible for a trial counsel adequately to
prepare the case for trial since he will not and cannot know what evidence he
will have to meet until it faces him in the courtroom"); id, at 290 (statement of
District of Columbia Bar Association) (unfairness may result from surprise
and a "novel offer" of hearsay evidence); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079 (ex-
plaining Committee's deletion of residual exceptions on grounds that they
would have had the effect of "injecting too much uncertainty into the law of
evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners to prepare for trial"). The
final version of the residual exceptions met the surprise objection by requiring
that notice be given before trial of intent to offer evidence under a residual
exception. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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ent in the case of the dying declaration or the excited utter-
ance.50 Perhaps the trial lawyers among them, familiar with
existing law and skilled in it, simply do not want to see it al-
tered. I cannot prove any of these explanations, but any of
them seem more probable to me than the thesis that they were
unconsciously worried about recanting declarants.
As for the admissions rule, academic commentators have
long recognized that it is not grounded in reliability.51 Even so,
other theories explain the rule better than the verdict stability
thesis. Perhaps one reason why opponents of free admissibility
have tolerated the rule is that many of them are concerned
about the danger of surprise at trial if hearsay is freely admit-
ted,52 and that danger may not be as great when the statement
of an attorney's own client, or client's agent, is offered as it is
when the declarant's connection with the lawsuit is not known
until trial. At any rate, the conventional explanations for the
rule seem more powerful than the verdict stability thesis. Ad-
missions can be seen as conduct of the party that contradicts
the position taken in the pleading and which therefore ought to
be brought to the attention of the trier of fact.5 3 Alternatively,
the admissions rule may be grounded in primitive ideas of fair-
ness: the party made the statement and is stuck with it. A per-
son cannot in fairness claim to have suffered from not being
able to cross-examine himself, or claim that he is not credible
except under oath.-
50. In the case of the dying declaration, the party against whom it is of-
fered is on notice, through the circumstances of the case, as to the identity of
the possible out-of-court declarant and the likelihood of a statement. In the
case of the excited utterance, the declarant must have been a witness to an ex-
citing event that is relevant to the lawsuit and must have made a statement
before the excitement subsided; thus the party against whom the statement is
offered has a basis for inferring by whom, when, and where excited utterances
might have been made.
51. See, e.g., MCCORMIcK, supra note 7, § 262, at 775 ("no objective guaran-
tee of trustworthiness is furnished by the admissions rule"); 2 E. MORGAN, BA-
SIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENcE 266 (1961) (admissions are admissible upon the
adversary theory of litigation and not upon the circumstances in which the
statement was made). The advisory committee's note to Rule 801(d)(2) states
that "[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an admis-
sion." FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note.
52. See supra note 49.
53. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1048, at 4; Strahorn, A Reconsidera-
tion of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, Part II, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 564, 573
(1937).
54. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1048, at 4 (a party does not need to
cross-examine himself).
One might also justify the admissions rule as a rule that is roughly based
on reliability and on guarantees against misuse of evidence by juries. The ad-
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Whether one agrees with these views or not, they probably
had greater appeal to lawmakers than the complicated and in-
genious case that Nesson makes for his explanation of the ad-
missions exception. Unconscious motives need to be direct and
primitive, not remote, contingent, and procedurally complex.
CONCLUSION
Despite their vastly different views about the purpose of
the hearsay rule, Nesson and Wigmore share two attitudes to-
ward hearsay analysis. Both are reductionists who refuse to
recognize multiple bases for the hearsay rule, and both treat
theories that fail to explain everything as if they explained
nothing. To Wigmore, if a theory about why hearsay is ex-
cluded did not account for a feature of the hearsay rule, then it
was "spurious."5 5 Rejecting "spurious" explanations, Wigmore
decided that lack of opportunity to test reliability with cross-ex-
amination was the sole basis for the hearsay rule.56 Nesson, in
turn, has rejected Wigmore's theory on grounds that it does not
explain everything and has sought to find another single basis
for the exclusion of hearsay.
No one objective can explain all of the features of the hear-
say rule. As suggested earlier, a variety of considerations have
shaped the rule and its exceptions. Distrust of statements by
declarants who cannot be cross-examined has played an impor-
tant role in shaping hearsay doctrine, but so have concerns
about perjury or mistake by in-court witnesses, about surprise
at trial, and about lawless juries, overreaching judges, and un-
scrupulous investigators. Professional selfishness and simple
procedural conservatism probably have also played a part. The
design of the hearsay rules and the legislative history of recent
attempts at reform indicate that lawmakers have responded to
these considerations, and not to Nesson's specter of the re-
canting declarant.
mission will often be against interest and hence will be more trustworthy than
ordinary statements. Moreover, the party against whom it is offered will usu-
ally have the opportunity to produce the declarant at trial to rebut or explain
the admission. These safeguards are not always present, but the admissions
rule could be seen as a flat rule that does justice in most situations and that,
for the sake of convenience, certainty, and clarity, has no exceptions for other
situations.
55. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1363, at 10.
56. See id. § 1362, at 7.
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